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Abstract:  
This paper re-examines the link between absolute prudence and self-protection 
activities. We show that the level of effort chosen by an agent with positive and 
decreasing absolute prudence is larger than the optimal effort chosen by a risk-neutral 
agent if the degree of absolute prudence is less than a threshold that is utility-
independent and empirically verifiable. We explain this threshold by a trade-off between 
the variation of the variance and the level of the third moment of the loss distribution. We 
also discuss our result in terms of skewness. Our contribution extends the model of 
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005). 
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1 Introduction
The optimality of self-protection activities was first examined by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). It
is well known that increased risk aversion does not necessarily raise the optimal investment in
prevention (see, e.g., Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Briys and Schlesinger, 1990; Briys et al.,
1991). This negative result is still not well explained in the literature.
Recently, some papers studied the effect of prudence on optimal prevention. Jullien, et al.
(1999) and Chiu (2000) show that prudence plays a role in the determination of thresholds for
optimal prevention. However, their thresholds are utility-dependent, and thus vary from agent
to agent. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) propose a sufficient condition on the loss probability of
the risk neutral agent to obtain the optimal effort chosen by a prudent (imprudent) agent to
be smaller (larger) than the optimal effort chosen by a risk-neutral agent. Since their threshold
probability is 12 , there is room to find a condition that would permit to obtain a larger level of
effort by prudent agents when p ≤ 12 .
We extend the analysis by linking differently optimal prevention and absolute prudence. We
show that the level of effort chosen by an agent with positive and decreasing absolute prudence
is larger than the optimal effort chosen by a risk-neutral agent if absolute prudence is less
than a threshold that is utility-independent, or stays the same for all agents. This threshold is
equal to the ”marginal change in probability on variance per third moment of loss distribution.”
Intuitively, the level of effort chosen by a prudent agent is larger than the optimal effort chosen
by a risk-neutral agent when the positive benefit, for a risk averse individual, of reducing the
variance is larger than the utility cost of spending money on protection for a prudent agent who
prefers to save money in such circumstance. Our contribution extends the model of Eeckhoudt
and Gollier (2005) 1.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and main result. Section
3 explains the result in terms of loss distribution moments and skewness. Section 4 shows how
the main result applies to HARA utility functions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1Menegatti (2009) proves that, in a two-period framework, prudence has a positive effect on optimal pre-
vention. Here we are limited to a single period model. Chiu (2005a) shows that, when protection activities
are mean-preserving, degree of absolute prudence plays an important role in determining the optimal choice of
self-protection. We do not consider the mean-preserving condition in this paper. Eeckhoudt et al. (2010) and
Dachraoui et al. (2004) consider background risk as well.
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2 The Model and Main Result
We consider an expected utility maximizer who is endowed with wealth w0 and faces the risk of
losing the amount L with probability p(e); e is the amount of money invested in prevention and
p(e) is differentiable with respect to e. We assume that the utility function u on final wealth is
increasing and differentiable. The decision problem for a risk-averse individual can be written
as
e∗ ∈ argmax
e≥0
V (e) = p(e)u(w0 − e− L) + (1− p(e))u(w0 − e). (1)
We assume that V is concave in e (see Arnott, 1991, and Jullien et al., 1999, for analysis of the
different conditions). The optimal preventive investment en for the risk-neutral agent, assuming
an interior solution, is given by
−p′(en)L = 1. (2)
Condition (2) states that the marginal cost must equal the marginal benefit. The effect of
prevention is limited to the variation of expected loss for this decision maker.
Define pn = p(en) as probability of loss of the risk-neutral agent, and wn = w0 − en as the
agent’s final wealth in the no-loss state. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (i) Risk-averse agents exert more effort than the risk-neutral agent if
AP (wn − y) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L], (3)
where AP (x) = −u′′′(x)u′′(x) is the absolute prudence coefficient (Kimball, 1990).
(ii )Risk-averse agents exert less effort than the risk-neutral agent if
AP (wn − y) ≥ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L]. (4)
Proof See Appendix.
When pn ≥ 12 , 1−2pnpn 1y ≤ 0, and AP ≥
1−2pn
pn
1
y for all prudent agents. Lemma 2.1 states that
prudent agents exert less effort than the risk-neutral agent. Dachraoui et al. (2004) showed
that pn ≤ 12 is a necessary condition for more mixed risk-averse agents to spend more effort.
Lemma 2.1 is a complement of their result. If pn ≤ 12 , then 1−2pnpn 1y ≥ 0, and AP ≤
1−2pn
pn
1
y
for all imprudent agents (AP (wn − y) < 0). Lemma 2.1 indicates that imprudent agents exert
more effort than the risk-neutral agent. Eeckhoudt and Gollier’s result (2005, Corollary 1) is
recovered.
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Lemma 2.1 states that the level of effort chosen by a prudent agent is larger (less) than the
optimal effort chosen by a risk-neutral agent if coefficient of absolute prudence is less (larger)
than a threshold for all level of loss y ≤ L. This threshold is utility-independent and stays
the same for all agents. However, it depends on the y values in interval [0, L]. If we use the
assumption of decreasing absolute prudence (DAP ), then these coefficients of absolute prudence
and thresholds depend only on loss L. In fact, part (i) of Lemma 2.1 implies the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.2 If pn < 12 and AP (wn−L) ≤ 1−2pnpn 1L , then risk-averse agents with DAP exert
more effort than the risk-neutral agent.
Proof Since
pn <
1
2
⇒ 1− 2pn
pn
1
L
≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L] (5)
and
DAP ⇒ AP (wn − y) ≤ AP (wn − L) for all y ∈ [0, L], (6)
we have
pn <
1
2
, DAP and AP (wn − L) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
L
(7)
⇒ AP (wn − y) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L]. (8)
By combining (8) with part (i) of Lemma 2.1, we obtain the result. Q.E.D.
When pn ≤ 12 , Proposition 2.2 provides an upper bound on absolute prudence, AP ≤ 1−2pnpn 1L ,
to obtain more effort by DAP agents than the risk-neutral agent. DAP was first defined by
Kimball (1990). He showed that DAP is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that the effect of
income risk on the marginal propensity to consume (or “precautionary premium”) is decreasing
in wealth. Since then, DAP has been associated to some other intuitive properties and there
are a number of arguments in favor of this assumption in the literature (see, e.g. Eeckhoudt and
Kimball (1991); Kimball (1993); Gollier (1996); and Gollier (2001)).
When pn < 12 , we also have
lim
pn→0
1− 2pn
pn
1
L
=∞ (9)
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and
lim
L→0
1− 2pn
pn
1
L
=∞. (10)
Hence, Proposition 2.2 suggests that, for small probability of loss (pn → 0), or small amount of
loss (L → 0), all decreasing prudent agents will exert more effort than the risk-neutral agent,
which may appear to be a paradox. However there exist many applications where L is large and
pn is very low (catastrophe loss, environmental loss) and where L is small and pn is quite high
but less than 12 (current life loss). In fact, there are very few risky situations where pn ≥ 12 . So
our condition provides guidance for an empirical test. It can be verified with information on pn,
L and w for a particular utility function.
Before explaining our result in terms of second and third moments, we give another expla-
nation for Proposition 2.2 in terms of relative prudence. We note that if wn − L > 0, then
AP (wn − L) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
L
(11)
⇔ −u
′′′(wn − L)
u′′(wn − L) ≤
1− 2pn
pn
1
L
⇔ −(wn − L)u
′′′(wn − L)
u′′(wn − L) ≤
1− 2pn
pn
wn − L
L
⇔ RP (wn − L) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
wn − L
L
, (12)
where RP (x) = −xu′′′(x)u′′(x) is the coefficient of relative prudence. Some contributions in the
literature suggest that the benchmark value for RP is 2 (see, e.g., Hadar and Seo, 1990; Choi
et al., 2001; Gollier, 2001, pp. 60-61; White, 2008; Eeckhoudt et al. 2009, Wang and Li 2010;
Chiu et al. 2010). Because
1− 2pn
pn
wn − L
L
≥ 2⇔ pn ≤ wn − L2wn , (13)
we get the following corollary from Proposition 2.2:
Corollary 2.3 If RP (wn − L) ≤ 2 and pn ≤ wn−L2wn , then risk-averse agents with DAP exert
more effort than the risk-neutral agent.2
3 An Explanation for the Threshold based on Moments
In this section, we show that a close examination of second and third moments of the loss
distribution explains Proposition 2.2 and the cost-benefit analysis of prevention for a risk-averse
2Notice that pn ≤ wn−L2wn = 12 − L2wn < 12 .
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and prudent agent.
Define
L˜oss =
 L with pn0 with 1− pn
as loss of the risk-neutral agent. The variance (or second central moment) of the loss is
V ar(L˜oss) = pn(1− pn)L2, (14)
and its third moment is equal to
E(L˜oss
3
) = pnL3. (15)
The marginal change in probability on variance is
dV ar(L˜oss)
dpn
= (1− 2pn)L2. (16)
Hence the threshold can be rewritten as
1− 2pn
pn
1
L
=
(1− 2pn)L2
pnL3
(17)
=
Marginal change in probability on variance
Third moment of loss
.
Proposition 2.2 states that risk-averse agents with DAP exert more effort than the risk-neutral
agent if AP is less than the ”marginal change in probability on variance per third moment of
loss distribution.”3
Another way to see the result is to note that more self-protection is desirable when (38) in
the Appendix is positive for all y ∈ [0, L]. Since
H ′′(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, L]⇔ AP (wn − y) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L] (20)
3Since the third central moment of loss is
E(L˜oss− EL˜oss)3 = pn(1− pn)(1− 2pn)L3, (18)
the threshold can also be rewritten as
1− 2pn
pn
1
L
=
pn(1− pn)(1− 2pn)L3
pn(1− pn)L2pnL
1
L
(19)
=
Third central moment of loss
(V ariance of loss) (Expected loss)
1
L
.
Hence, the threshold can also be interpreted as a trade-off among loss amount, expected loss, variance and third
central moment.
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and
DAP and H ′′(L) ≥ 0⇒ AP (wn − y) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L], (21)
then more self-protection is desirable when
H ′′(L) = (2pn − 1)u′′(wn − L)− pnLu′′′(wn − L) (22)
is positive. (22) can be rewritten as
H ′′(L)L2 = (2pn − 1)L2u′′(wn − L)− pnL3u′′′(wn − L). (23)
We see from (23) that our sufficient condition includes the variation of the variance and the level
of the third moment. The variation of the variance and the level of the third moment multiply
u′′(wn −L) and u′′′(wn −L) respectively. Hence, when p < 12 , the cost-benefit of self-protection
for a risk-averse and decreasing prudent agent is equal to a reduction in the variance, which is
(most of the time) desirable for a risk-averse agent, less the utility cost of spending money for
protection against an uncertain event, which is not desirable for a prudent agent who prefers to
save money in such circumstance (Kimball, 1990).
This trade-off was suggested in a comment by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005):
When pn is larger than 12 , the effect of risk aversion goes in the same direction as
the effect of prudence to generate a smaller level of effort. In the more interesting
case where pn is less than 12 , these two effects go in opposite directions.
We now interpret the result in terms of skewness. In the statistics literature, skewness is
often proposed to measure downside risk. It is well known that an increase of skewness will
imply an increase in downside risk only under specific conditions (Chiu, 2005b; Menezes et al.,
1980). In our application, more self-protection yields a new distribution that is more skewed to
the left. The skewness of L˜oss is defined as
SLoss =
E[L˜oss−E(L˜oss)]3
[V ar(L˜oss)]
3
2
. (24)
Since
E[L˜oss− E(L˜oss)]3 (25)
= pn(y − pnL)3 + (1− pn)(−pnL)3 = pn(1− pn)(1− 2pn)L3,
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we have
SLoss =
1− 2pn√
pn(1− pn)
. (26)
Figure 3.1 V ariance = p((1− p))L2 with L = 1
Figure 3.2 Skewness = 1−2p√
p(1−p)
We observe that (26) is independent of L. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the variance and
skewness of loss distribution as a function of p. We observe that the variance first increases when
p < 12 and then decreases when p increases. The skewness always decreases when p increases
but is positive when p < 12 and negative otherwise.
When pn < 12 , for the risk-averse and decreasing prudent agent, there is a trade-off between
the variance and the skewness of the loss distribution. Spending more on self-protection (re-
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ducing p) decreases the variance of loss (see Figure 3.1), which is desirable. However, for the
prudent agent, spending more on self-protection increases the positive skewness of loss (see Fig-
ure 3.2 ), which is undesirable in this application. Hence, when pn < 12 , the cost-benefit analysis
of preventive actions for a risk-averse and prudent agent depends on the trade-off between the
decrease in the variance and the increase in the skewness. As shown by Chiu (2005b), prudence
has an important role to play for characterizing this trade-off when both distributions have the
same expected mean. Here we show that this is also the case even when self-protection changes
the expected loss.
We propose a sufficient condition for more self-protection by a risk-averse and decreasing
prudent agent in terms of the skewness of loss.
If pn < 12 , then
SLoss =
1− 2pn√
pn(1− pn)
<
1− 2pn
pn
. (27)
From Proposition 2.2, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose pn < 12 , risk-averse and decreasing prudent agents exert more effort
than the risk-neutral agent if
AP (wn − L) ≤ SLoss
L
. (28)
Corollary 3.1 provides a short-cut sufficient condition for decreasing prudent agents to exert
more effort than the risk-neutral agent: absolute prudence be less than skewness of loss per
amount of loss.
4 Sufficient Conditions for HARA
In the economic literature, the class of harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions
is particularly useful to derive analytical results. HARA utility functions take the following form:
u(x) = ζ(η +
x
γ
)1−γ , (29)
and the absolute prudence coefficient is equal to (see e.g., Gollier, 2001, p. 26)
AP (x) =
γ + 1
γ
(η +
x
γ
)−1. (30)
Hence Proposition 2.2 implies the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.1 Suppose DAP and HARA, risk-averse agents exert more effort than the risk-
neutral agent if
γ + 1
γ
(η +
wn − L
γ
)−1 ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
L
. (31)
The sufficient condition for some well known HARA utility functions is summarized in the
following table.
Parameter Utility AP (wn − L) AP (wn − L) ≤ 1−2pnpn 1L
γ = −1 Quadratic 0 pn ≤ 12
η = 0 and γ = 1 Logarithmic 2wn−L
L
wn−L ≤
1−2pn
2pn
η = 0 and γ 6= 1 Power γ+1wn−L Lwn−L ≤
1−2pn
(1+γ)pn
γ →∞ Negative exponential 1η 1η ≤ 1−2pnpn 1L
Table 4.1: HARA utility functions
From Table 4.1, we observe that, for quadratic, logarithmic, power (γ < −1) and negative
exponential (η > 0) functions , pn ≤ 12 is a necessary condition for these sufficient conditions.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the link between optimal prevention and prudence by providing a sufficient
condition for risk-averse agents with DAP to exert more self-protection than a risk-neutral agent.
We have formalized the intuition by using the second and third moment of the loss distribution.
We have also interpreted our main result in terms of the skewness of the loss distribution.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Because V is concave, the optimal effort e∗ for a risk-averse agent will be larger than en if and
only if V ′(en) is positive:
V ′(en) = −[pnu′(wn − L) + (1− pn)u′(wn)]− p′(en)[u(wn)− u(wn − L)] ≥ 0. (32)
Using condition (2), we see that V ′(en) ≥ 0 if and only if
u(wn)− u(wn − L)
L
≥ pnu′(wn − L) + (1− pn)u′(wn) (33)
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or if and only if
u(wn)− u(wn − L)− L[pnu′(wn − L) + (1− pn)u′(wn)] ≥ 0. (34)
Given L, we have fixed en and pn (by (2)). Define
H(y) = u(wn)− u(wn − y)− y[pnu′(wn − y) + (1− pn)u′(wn)], for y ∈ [0, L], (35)
then
H(L) ≥ 0⇔ V ′(en) ≥ 0. (36)
We note that H(0) = 0 and
H ′(y) = (1− pn)[u′(wn − y)− u′(wn)] + pnyu′′(wn − y). (37)
Moreover, (37) implies that H ′(0) = 0 and
H ′′(y) = (2pn − 1)u′′(wn − y)− pnyu′′′(wn − y). (38)
Since
H ′(0) = 0 and H ′′(y) ≥ 0(≤ 0) for all y ∈ [0, L] (39)
⇒ H ′(y) ≥ 0(≤ 0) for all y ∈ [0, L]
and
H(0) = 0 and H ′(y) ≥ 0(≤ 0) for all y ∈ [0, L] (40)
⇒ H(y) ≥ 0(≤ 0) for all y ∈ [0, L]
⇒ H(L) ≥ 0(≤ 0),
we conclude that H ′′(y) ≥ 0(≤ 0) for all y ∈ [0, L] is a sufficient condition for H(L) ≥ 0(≤ 0).
(i) Because
AP (wn − y) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L] (41)
⇔ −u
′′′(wn − y)
u′′(wn − y) ≤
1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L]
⇔ H ′′(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, L], (42)
we obtain
AP (wn − y) ≤ 1− 2pn
pn
1
y
for all y ∈ [0, L] (43)
⇒ H(L) ≥ 0
⇔ V ′(en) ≥ 0.
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(ii) We can prove this assertion by the same approach used in (i). Q.E.D.
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